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The Federal Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury
for the Offense of Driving While Intoxicated
Drunk driving causes at least one-half of all highway
deaths and accidents in the United States.' Although the
number of persons arrested is extremely low in relation to the
number of drunk drivers on the road,2 more people in the
United States are charged with the crime of driving while in-
toxicated (DWI)3 than with any other crime.4 The very large
number of intoxicated drivers poses a constant safety threat to
highway users,5 and results in enormous economic losses.6 In
response to the drunk driving problem, most states have en-
1. See Daly & Kassekert, Can the Courts Cope with Alcoholism?, 8 UP-
DATE ON LAw-RELATED EDUC., Winter 1984, at 42, 44 (according to patholo-
gists' organization, drunk drivers are involved in 90% of fatal accidents);
Quade, The Drunk Driver: Where do we go from here?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1201, 1202
(1983) (stating "alcohol is involved in 55% of all fatal highway crashes and is
responsible for up to 27,500 deaths and 700,000 injuries a year").
2. See Comment, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660,
1677 (1981) (noting drunk driver has one in 2000 chance of apprehension); see
also R. HAGEN, E. McCONNELL & R. WILLIAMS, SUSPENSION & REVOCATION
EFFECTS ON THE DWI OFFENDER 13 (1980) (stating each drunk driver commits
between 200 and 2000 DWIs before identification).
3. Some jurisdictions classify the offense as driving under the influence
of alcohol and thus use the abbreviation DUI. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
1567 (Supp. 1987); see generally 3 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW &
PROCEDURE §§ 990-98 (1957 & Supp. 1979) (discussing history and elements of
DWI).
4. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1984
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 163 (1985) [hereinafter
CRIME REPORTS]. In 1984, there were almost 1.8 million DWI arrests. Id. As-
suming a drunk driver has only a one in 2000 chance of arrest, see supra note
2, nearly 3.6 billion instances of DWI may occur each year--an average of al-
most 15 instances of drunk driving per year for every citizen of the United
States. Cf. Rubenstein, Tough Laws Mean High Fees for DWI Lawyers, 1
Minn. L.J., Feb. 27, 1987, at 1, 11 (stating 25% of all Minnesota arrests are for
DWI).
5. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1674 (stating blood alcohol level of
.15% increases chance of involvement in fatal accident 25 times); see also Starr,
The War Against Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34 (citing na-
tional statistics that 10% of all drivers are legally intoxicated on weekend
nights).
6. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1
(1983) [hereinafter REPORT] (stating annual cost of drunk driving exceeds $20
billion).
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acted more stringent penalties for DWI7 and have increased en-
forcement of these laws.8  In addition, many citizens'
organizations publicize and attempt to combat this problem.9
As the penalties for, and recognition10 of, the DWI problem
increase, courts often face the issue of whether the United
States Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial for DWI
defendants. 1 Federal courts are divided over the issue of
whether DWI is a petty'2 or serious13 offense and thus whether
7. In 1982, at least 27 states strengthened their DWI penalties. See Starr,
supra note 5, at 35. In 1983, 40 states passed tougher drunk driving laws. Daly
& Kassekert, supra note 1, at 44. See also REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (noting
that in one year 41 states established task forces to study DWI).
8. See CRIME REPORTS, supra note 4, at 166 (indicating that DWI arrests
increased 52% from 1975 to 1984).
9. The largest of these groups is Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD), which has approximately 600,000 members. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASSOCIATIONS 1080 (22d ed. 1988). Other similar groups include Citizens for
Safe Drivers Against Drunk Drivers/Chronic Offenders, National Commission
Against Drunk Drivers (NCADD), React International: CB Radio Coalition
Against Drunk Drivers, Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), Students Against
Drunk Drivers (SADD), and Truckers Against Drunk Drivers (TADD). Id. at
1079, 1081-83; see also infra note 173 and accompanying text (describing activi-
ties of citizens' organizations).
10. See Quade, War on Drunk Driving: 25,000 Lives at Stake, 68 A.B.A. J.
1551, 1551 (1982) (politicians, judges, and citizens believe drunk driving "has
been a national epidemic and a disgrace long enough"); see also South Dakota
v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) (lamenting well-documented carnage caused
by drunk drivers as a tragedy); H.R. DOC. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1967) ("Every witness who testified before the committee expressed deep and
growing concern regarding the incidence of impairment by alcohol in relation
to highway accidents."); infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing
social stigma associated with DWI).
11. This Note deals with the right to a jury trial under federal constitu-
tional law. States remain free to grant the right to a jury trial for petty of-
fenses. See infra note 20.
Many DWI lawyers believe that DWI defendants fare better in a jury trial.
See 4 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 37.01, at 37-4 (3d ed.
1987) (stating jury trial is preferable because jurors are likely to have experi-
ence with alcohol and judges are reluctant to acquit); H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JuRy 68, 71, 295-96 (1966) (stating juries tend to be more leni-
ent than judges to drunk drivers); Hollander, Defending a Drunk Driver, 10
LITIGATION 25, 28 (1984) (stating that defendant is more likely to raise doubt
with the jury because judges are "practically immune" to DWI defenses). In
addition, many people believe that drunk driving laws are too severe. Jury
discretion therefore tends to limit the enforcement of DWI laws. See H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra, at 287, 293-96, 308-10.
12. A petty offense is defined as "[a] crime, the maximum punishment for
which is generally a fine or short term in jail or house of correction. In some
states, it is a classification in addition to misdemeanor and felony." BLACK'S
LAw DICIONARY 1032 (5th ed. 1979).
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the right to a jury trial attaches.14 When making such a deter-
mination, most courts focus on the potential length of imprison-
ment. If the court views the potential prison sentence as
severe, the offense will be deemed a serious offense and the
right to a jury trial will be available to the defendant. The sen-
tence for DWI, however, is likely to include significant penal-
ties other than imprisonment.15 As a result, courts using
imprisonment-focused criteria 6 for determining the right to a
13. For purposes of the federal constitutional right to trial by jury, a seri-
ous offense is any crime that is not classified as petty. See id. at 1226.
Historically, the right to a jury trial protected only those defendants
charged with serious offenses; a judge heard trials for petty offenses. In the
sixteenth century the English parliament, primarily because of congestion in
English courts, enacted statutes creating a class of minor offenses to be tried
without a jury under the summary disposition of a judge. The scope of the ex-
ception continually grew, and by 1776 more than 100 different offenses were
prosecuted before a judge. All of the American colonies also resorted to sum-
mary disposition of many offenses under the petty offense exclusion. See
Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Offenses and the Constitutional Guarantee of
Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 934-65 (1926). During the colonial period,
"acts were dealt with summarily which did not offend too deeply the moral
purposes of the community, which were not too close to society's danger, and
were stigmatized by punishment relatively light." Id. at 980-81. See generally
G. RADCLIFFE & G. CRoss, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 98-112 (5th ed. 1971)
(discussing Star-chamber trials of misdemeanor offenses).
Courts and commentators agree that the framers of the Constitution ac-
cepted and intended to maintain the petty offense exception, even though they
did not include it in the Constitution. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
160 (1968) (finding no substantial evidence that framers intended to depart
from common-law practice of trying petty offenses without juries); Ex parte
Grossman, 269 U.S. 87, 108 (1925) (interpreting Constitution by reference to
common law at time of framing), overruled on other grounds, INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904) (stating that
framers' intent was to exclude petty offenses from right to jury trial); Frank-
furter & Corcoran, supra, at 967-75 (stating that framers recognized petty of-
fense exception and did not intend to extend right beyond established
practice). But see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers 26 U. CHM. L. REV.
245 (1959) (arguing that framers intended right to jury trial for all offenses).
14. See Landry v. Hoepfner (Landry II), 840 F.2d 1201, 1214 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (holding that DWI is petty offense when maximum imprisonment
does not exceed six months), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No.
88-5043-CFH); Landry v. Hoepfner (Landry I), 818 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that DWI is serious offense due to statutory penalties and col-
lateral consequences), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), petition
for cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH); United States v. Sain,
795 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding DWI is petty offense); United States
v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 475 (4th Cir.) (holding DWI is petty offense based on
maximum statutory imprisonment), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); United
States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding DWI is serious offense
because of combined penalties of imprisonment, license revocation, and fine).
15. See infra notes 113-37 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 28-35, 98-102 and accompanying text. Courts also have
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jury trial often experience difficulty in deciding whether that
right extends to the DWI defendant.17
This Note examines when a DWI defendant should have a
federal constitutional right to a jury trial.'- Part I reviews the
criteria courts use to determine whether a criminal defendant
has the right to trial by jury and Part II examines how federal
courts view this right with respect to the DWI defendant. Part
III critiques the three lines of analysis that courts use in deter-
mining whether a DWI statute affords a defendant the right to
a jury trial. Part IV argues that courts should consider all the
statutory penalties in determining the right to a jury trial in
DWI cases, but should not take into account any collateral con-
sequences of a conviction. The Note concludes that because of
the unique nature and variety of statutory penalties for DWI,
the right to a jury trial should be constitutionally guaranteed if
the statute imposes substantial penalties of any sort.
I. DISTINGUISHING PETTY AND SERIOUS OFFENSES:
THE SUPREME COURT'S CRITERIA
The United States Constitution does not distinguish be-
tween petty and serious offenses.19 The United States Supreme
used other criteria, such as collateral consequences, in deciding whether the
right to a jury trial attaches. See infra notes 48-52, 167-82 and accompanying
text.
17. See 4 R. ERWIN, supra note 11, § 37.02, at 37-5 (noting "distinction be-
tween serious and petty offenses remains unclear, particularly in [DWI
cases]"); see also supra note 14; infra notes 59-89 and accompanying text.
18. The sixth amendment jury trial right applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149-50 (1968).
Courts are more seriously divided on the right to a jury trial for DWI than
on any other jury right issue. At least 10 courts have held that DWI is a seri-
ous offense even when the imprisonment possible does not exceed six months.
See supra note 14; infra note 88. In contrast, courts have found that defend-
ants have a right to a trial by jury in only four recent non-DWI cases when
potential imprisonment did not exceed six months. See infra note 34; see also
4 R. ERwIN, supra note 11, § 37.01, at 37-5 (noting division among state courts
on whether DWI is serious offense).
19. The early American colonists cherished the right to a trial by jury.
Examples of documents that incorporated this right include King James I's In-
structions for the Government of the Colony of Virginia, 1606; Massachusetts
Body of Liberties, 1628; Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
1677; and Frame of Government of Pennsylvania, 1682. See L. MOORE, THE
JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 97-99 (1973); R. PERRY & J.
COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 37, 74, 185, 217 (1959). The jury right was
often advocated in response to British tyranny. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (framers of early constitutions included right to jury
trial to protect against unfounded charges designed to eliminate enemies); R.
1988]
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Court, however, has enunciated criteria that courts should con-
sider when determining whether an offense is petty or seri-
ous.2 0 The most important of these criteria is the severity of
PERRY & J. COOPER, supra, at 261-69; cf THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 581-82 (A.
Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1864) (stating that reason for high regard for jury
trials was belief that juries would prevent arbitrary and oppressive govern-
ment). As a result, many of this country's principal documents include a jury
trial guarantee. See Jacobs, Trial by Jury, Petty Offenses, and the First
Amendment, 46 N.D. LAW. 295, 295 (1971) (stating "the right to trial by jury in
criminal prosecutions was the only procedural safeguard guaranteed by the
constitutions and bills of rights of all the original states"); see generally R.
PERRY & J. COOPER, supra (examining major colonial documents and early
state constitutions). The Declaration of Independence also included the jury
trial protection. The Declaration of Independence para. 2, 20 (U.S. 1776) ('The
history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries
and usurpations ... depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by
Jury."). The framers of the Constitution included the jury trial guarantee in
article III. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("[tlhe Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury"). In addition, the guarantee was
later included in the Bill of Rights. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. ("[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury"). The jury trial provisions of article HI and of the sixth
amendment do not differ with regard to the grade of offense giving rise to the
jury right. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549-51 (1888); see also supra note
13 (framers intended to maintain distinction between petty and serious of-
fenses).
The use of jury trials dates back to ancient Greece. See M. LESSER, THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 14-28 (1894) (discussing
dikasts, juries of ancient Greece). The recorded history of jury trials is often
incomplete and open to debate. For a thorough examination of the history of
the jury trial, see generally P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956); W. FORSYTH,
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURy (1876); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 298-350 (7th ed. 1956); M. LESSER, supra; Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra
note 13, at 922-65.
20. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (stating that in absence of constitutional
definition, courts must make the petty or serious distinction); 4 R. ERWIN,
supra note 11, § 37.02, at 37-6 (stating "the task of separating the petty from
serious infractions must be done by the courts"); see also infra notes 28-55 and
accompanying text (discussing statutory penalties, common-law tests, and col-
lateral consequences); see generally Annotation, Distinction Between "Petty"
and "Serious" Offenses for Purposes of Federal Constitutional Right to Trial
by Jury-Supreme Court Cases, 26 L. ED. 2D 916 (1971) (discussing Supreme
Court's right to jury trial cases and criteria).
Each of the 50 states has a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right
to a jury trial that, in many instances, is more extensive than the federal con-
stitutional right. See Note, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right to a
Jury Trial, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 212 n.51 (1979) (listing states' constitu-
tional jury right provisions). States may, under their own laws, grant greater
scope to the right to trial by jury than the United States Constitution affords.
Cf Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (stating that "a State is free as a
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than...
necessary upon federal constitutional standards"). Several states do not ex-
clude petty offenses from the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Baker v. City of
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the maximum statutory penalty.21 In addition, courts may con-
sider the traditional common-law tests:22 the nature of the of-
fense,2 3 whether the offense was malum in se,24 and whether
the offense was indictable at common law.25 Some Justices also
encourage an examination of the nonstatutory collateral conse-
quences 26 of a conviction.2
7
In its most recent opinions on the right to trial by jury,28
the Supreme Court has emphasized that the most relevant cri-
terion is the maximum possible statutory penalty29 for the of-
fense in question.30 In Baldwin v. New York,31 the Court held
Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401 (Alaska 1970) (holding that defendants have jury
right whether accused of violation of state law or municipal ordinance); Mills
v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.3d 288, 298, 515 P.2d 273, 280, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 336
(1973) (stating that "every misdemeanor defendant has a right to a trial by
jury"); Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 561 (Wyo. 1986) (holding state
constitution requires jury trial for any length of imprisonment); see generally
4 R. ERWIN, supra note 11, § 37.03 (discussing statutory right to jury trial for
DWI).
21. See infra note 30.
22. Some of these common-law tests were laid out in Cheff v. Schnacken-
berg, 384 U.S. 373, 390 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The principal inquiry
... relates to the character and gravity of the offense itself. Was it an indicta-
ble offense at common law? Is it malum in se or malum prohibitum? What
stigma attaches to those convicted of committing the offense?").
23. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
26. Collateral consequences in this Note refers only to the nonstatutory
consequences affecting the individual charged with or convicted of an offense.
Several courts have used the term to refer to statutory penalties beyond im-
prisonment (for example, license revocation). See United States v. Craner, 652
F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (D.
Md. 1978). This Note therefore defines statutory penalty more broadly than
several courts do by including license revocation, community service, and all
state-imposed sanctions in the definition.
27. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
28. The Supreme Court has not decided a major criminal right to jury
trial case, other than criminal contempt cases, since 1970. See Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 74 (1970); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 21.1(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (discussing Baldwin and other major criminal
right to jury trial cases).
29. In determining the right to trial by jury, as opposed to the right to
counsel, courts traditionally have looked at the maximum potential conse-
quences, not the actual consequences, of the offense. Compare Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 & n.35 (1968) (basing jury trial right determination
on possible penalty) with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (basing
right to counsel on any actual incarceration) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 38-40 (1972) (same).
30. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (stating that "the
most relevant... criteri[on] [is] the severity of the maximum authorized pen-
alty"); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969) (stating that severity of
19881
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that any offense carrying a possible imprisonment of more than
six months is a serious crime, allowing the defendant to invoke
the right to a jury trial.32 Although the Baldwin Court held
that possible imprisonment for more than six months is a pen-
alty severe enough to activate the right to a jury trial, the
Court did not hold that such possible imprisonment is a neces-
sary condition.33 The Court continues to recognize that a de-
fendant not subject to possible imprisonment of more than six
months may nonetheless be able to invoke the right to a jury
trial.34 Moreover, the Court has never overruled earlier cases
in which it held certain offenses to be serious even though the
possible imprisonment did not exceed six months.3 5
authorized penalty is "the most relevant indication of the seriousness of an of-
fense"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (stating that "the pen-
alty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance").
31. 399 U.S. 66 (1970). In Baldwin, the defendant was charged with the
misdemeanor of "jostling" (pickpocketing), which carried a maximum impris-
onment of one year. Id. at 67.
32. Id. at 69. The Court has often noted that in the late eighteenth cen-
tury offenses triable without a jury were primarily those punishable by no
more than a six-month term of imprisonment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 161 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 626 (1937);
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 13, at 934; see also Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (holding that possible two-year imprisonment indicates
offense is serious).
33. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69 n.6 (stating "we decide only that a poten-
tial sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment is sufftciently severe by
itself to take the offense out of the category of 'petty' ") (emphasis added); see
also id. at 73 (stating that jury right may be outweighed when imprisonment
does not exceed six months); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)
("Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury
trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses.") (emphasis added); United
States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that no Justice has ever
stated that if imprisonment does not exceed six months, court must classify of-
fense as petty); 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 28, § 21.1, at 691, 693
(stating Baldwin did not hold that offenses punishable by six or fewer months
are petty); infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
34. See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1930) (reckless
driving); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 556-57 (1888) (conspiracy).
In only four recent non-DWI cases have courts found a right to a jury trial
when the possible imprisonment did not exceed six months. See United States
v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1976) (conspiracy to deceive immi-
gration officials); United States v. Thomas, 574 F. Supp. 197, 198-99 (D.D.C.
1983) (placement of "structure" on White House sidewalk), aff'd, 753 F.2d 167
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 873 (1985); State v. Superior Court, 121
Ariz. 174, 175-76, 589 P.2d 48, 49-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (shoplifting); Reed v.
State, 470 So. 2d 1382, 1384 (Fla. 1985) (criminal mischief); see also supra note
14; infra note 88 (noting that at least ten courts have found that DWI is seri-
ous offense when imprisonment does not exceed six months).
35. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 28, § 21.1, at 693 (stating
that Baldwin does not disturb decisions that provide another basis for right to
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The Court also has used three different criteria based on
the common law to determine whether an offense is petty or
serious.36 The nature of the offense test requires a court to
consider the seriousness of the crime, rather than the severity
of the penalty, to determine whether the crime is a petty or se-
rious offense. If a court determines that a particular offense is
of grave character or involves moral turpitude, the crime is se-
rious and the defendant may invoke the right to a jury trial.37
For example, the Supreme Court has held that reckless driv-
ing38 and conspiracy39 are of a grave character and therefore
are serious offenses.
Another common-law test, closely related to the nature of
the offense test, requires a court to determine whether an of-
fense is malum prohibitum4 ° or malum in se 41-that is, whether
jury trial); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D
§ 371, at 295 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (stating that "cases on the books, and never
overruled, suggest that some crimes are sufficiently serious that they carry a
constitutional right of jury trial regardless of the penalty authorized"); see also
supra notes 33-34; infra note 109 and accompanying text.
36. The Supreme Court has not applied these common-law criteria con-
sistently; in more recent opinions the statutory penalty has become the pri-
mary criterion. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-70 (1970)
(considering "severity of the maximum authorized penalty"); Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-61 (1968) (stating "the penalty authorized for a particu-
lar offense is of major relevance"); see also supra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text (discussing recent cases and emphasis on authorized statu-
tory penalty); see generally 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 28, § 21.1
(discussing right to jury trial and definition of petty offense).
37. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937) (holding
that illegal dealing in property involves no moral turpitude); District of Co-
lumbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (holding that reckless driving is grave
offense); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67 (1904) (holding that purchase
of unbranded oleomargarine involves no moral delinquency); Natal v. Louisi-
ana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 (1891) (holding that public market violation is petty of-
fense); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 556 (1888) (holding that conspiracy is
offense of grave character); see generally Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpi-
tude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117 (1929) (detailing crimes considered to involve moral
turpitude).
Many lower courts continue to use the nature of the offense test. See, e.g.,
State v. Superior Court, 121 Ariz. 174, 175-76, 589 P.2d 48, 49 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that shoplifting involves moral turpitude); State v. Wilke, 291
N.W.2d 792, 794 (S.D. 1980) (holding that failure to display automobile sticker
is not morally offensive); see also infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
38. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930); see infra notes 43-
44 and accompanying text.
39. Callan, 127 U.S. at 556.
40. Malum prohibitum is defined as "a thing which is wrong because pro-
hibited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its
commission is expressly forbidden by positive law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
865 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
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the act is simply prohibited or is inherently wrong.4 If a court
determines that an offense is inherently wrong or malum in se,
the defendant may invoke the right to a jury trial. In District
of Columbia v. Colts,43 the Supreme Court held that reckless
driving was a malum in se offense," marking the only time the
Court has ever made a malum in se finding.45
In addition, the Court has found the right to a jury trial if
the offense was indictable at common law at the time the
United States Constitution was adopted.4 If a defendant could
41. Malum in se is defined as "[a] wrong in itself; an act or case involving
illegality from the very nature of the transaction, upon principles of natural,
moral, and public law." Id
42. Despite the similarity to the nature of the offense test, the Court in
Colts used this as a separate line of inquiry. Colts, 282 U.S. at 73 (reckless driv-
ing is malum in se offense); see also Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (encouraging use of malum in se test); see gen-
erally Note, The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and Mala In Se in Crim-
inal Law, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 74 (1938) (examining history of distinction as
well as its significance and utility).
Many lower courts continue to use the malum in se test. See, e.g., United
States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that interference with
forest officers is malum prohibitum); United States v. Stewart, 568 F.2d 501,
503 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that assault is malum prohibitum); United States
v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that conspiracy is
malum in se); United States v. Morrison, 425 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D. Md. 1977)
(holding that speeding is malum prohibitum); Reed v. State, 470 So. 2d 1382,
1384 (Fla. 1985) (holding that criminal mischief is malum in se); see also infra
notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
43. 282 U.S. 63 (1930). Although the penalty for reckless driving of an au-
tomobile was a $100 fine and 30 days' imprisonment, the Court in Colts held
that the offense was serious, partly because the offense "shocks the general
moral sense." IH at 73.
44. Id. (stating that offense "is not merely malum prohibitum, but in its
very nature is malum in se").
45. See infra note 151; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing use and history of malum in se).
46. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937) (find-
ing that sale of second-hand property was not indictable at common law);
Colts, 282 U.S. at 73 (finding reckless driving similar to common-law offense of
public nuisance); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904) (finding know-
ing purchase of oleomargarine not indictable at common law); Callan v. Wil-
son, 127 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1888) (finding conspiracy indictable at common law);
see generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 13, at 934-65 (examining of-
fenses indictable at common law in the colonies).
Lower courts also continue to use the indictable at common law test. See,
e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding
conspiracy indictable at common law); United States v. Newberne, 427 F. Supp.
361, 362 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (finding assault not indictable); State v. Superior
Court, 121 Ariz. 174, 176, 589 P.2d 48, 50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (finding shoplift-
ing related to common-law offense of larceny); Reed v. State, 470 So. 2d 1382,
1384 (Fla. 1985) (finding criminal mischief indictable).
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not be indicted at common law for a particular offense, but a
similar offense was indictable at common law, the Court also
has found the right to trial by jury47
Supreme Court precedent does not mandate that a court
consider the collateral consequences 48 of a conviction when de-
termining whether the right to a jury trial exists. Two Justices,
however, have urged the adoption of a collateral consequences
test,49 which requires a court to consider not only the statutory
penalties, but also all other consequences of a conviction. Many
federal and state courts have examined collateral consequences,
primarily in DWI cases,50 because a DWI conviction can result
in significant nonstatutory consequences, including financial
costs51 and public scorn. 52 For example, if there are significant
47. The Supreme Court has never dearly specified what constitutes suffi-
cient similarity or how courts should use common-law principles. See Colts,
282 U.S. at 71-73; United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1342-44 (D. Md.
1978); infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
48. For this Note's definition of collateral consequences, see supra note 26;
see also 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 11, § 2B.01, at 2B-1 (noting that additional non-
judicial consequences inevitably flow to drunk driver).
49. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 762-63 (1984) (White, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (stating that courts should consider collateral con-
sequences, especially in DWI cases); cf Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69
(1970) ("the collateral consequences attaching to a felony conviction are more
severe than those attaching to a conviction for a misdemeanor"); Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("What
stigma attaches to those convicted of committing the offense?"). Some lower
courts have interpreted Baldwin as specifically authorizing an examination of
collateral consequences. See United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1345
(D. Md. 1978).
50. See, e.g., Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987) (con-
sidering suspension of driving privileges, attendance at alcohol treatment
center, and increased insurance costs), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), petition for cert filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH); United
States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir.) (considering community service,
treatment programs, and the national public attitude toward DWI), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir.
1981) (considering suspension of driving privileges); Bronson v. Swinney, 648
F. Supp. 1094, 1100-01 (D. Nev. 1986) (considering social stigma attached to
driving while intoxicated); United States v. Thomas, 574 F. Supp. 197, 198
(D.D.C. 1983) (noting that incarceration would take away defendant's constitu-
tional right to maintain protest), aff'd, 753 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert de-
nied, 474 U.S. 873 (1985); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (D.
Md. 1978) (considering suspension of driving privileges); Brady v. Blair, 427 F.
Supp. 5, 9-10 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (considering license suspension and ethical con-
demnation); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 44-45, 410 P.2d 479,
484-85 (1966) (en banc) (same); Parham v. Municipal Court, 86 S.D. 531, 538,
199 N.W.2d 501, 505 (1972) (considering suspension of driving privileges).
51. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text; Argersinger v. Hamlin,
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attorney's fees, loss of a job, or other substantial costs of com-
plying with the statutory penalties, a judge applying this test
could grant the right to a jury trial.
Thus, although an offense that carries a possible prison
sentence of more than six months is always a serious crime that
triggers the right to a jury trial, a DWI defendant also may in-
voke this right in other circumstances. Lower courts have
found that a federal constitutional right to a jury trial can arise
from other statutory penalties, 53 common-law criteria,M or col-
lateral consequences of a conviction.55
II. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED: PETTY OR
SERIOUS OFFENSE?
Although legislative bodies define the statutory penalties
for DWI, courts must determine whether a DWI defendant has
a right to a jury trial.56 While Baldwin's six-month standard
sets one clear threshold for granting the right,5 7 federal and
state courts have had difficulty in determining which offenses
with a maximum imprisonment of six months or less, especially
DWI, are nonetheless serious.5 8
In United States v. Craner,5 9 the Ninth Circuit60 held that a
defendant charged with DWI in a national park had the right to
a jury trial because the defendant faced the possibility of a six-
407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that stigma attaches af-
ter drunk-driving conviction); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 5, 9 (E.D. Ohio 1976)
(noting that community condemns a drunk driver).
53. See infra notes 113-37 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 138-66 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
56. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) ("In the absence of
an explicit constitutional provision, the definitional task necessarily falls on
the courts, which must . . . pass upon the validity of legislative attempts to
identify those petty offenses which are exempt from jury trial ...
57. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 14; infra note 88 and accompanying text.
59. 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981).
60. Craner was arrested for DWI in Yosemite National Park, a federal ju-
risdiction. Craner therefore was prosecuted in federal court. Id at 24. Fed-
eral law applied because DWI in a national park violates regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. Id. Federal district courts also
have jurisdiction over DWIs committed on federal military reservations, see
infra note 68, and federal courts consider DWI offenses brought before them
on petition for a writ of habeas corpus; see Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169,
1170 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH).
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month imprisonment, a $500 fine,61 and a six-month license
revocation.62 The court found that the United States Supreme
Court holding in Colts63 mandated designating DWI as a serious
offense because DWI is analogous to reckless driving and thus
is malum in se.64 Moreover, the Craner court emphasized that
the community perceived DWI to be a serious offense, as indi-
cated by the possible license revocation and by the widespread
granting of the right to a jury trial.6
In United States v. Jenkins,66 a Fourth Circuit case, three
defendants were charged with DWI on a South Carolina mili-
tary reservation.6 7 South Carolina law68 mandated that courts
impose a minimum penalty and allowed possible penalties of a
thirty-day imprisonment, a $200 fine, a six-month license revo-
cation, and community service.69 The Jenkins court held that
the South Carolina DWI statute was lenient because it allowed
imprisonment up to only thirty days7" and thus the defendants
did not have the right to a jury trial.7 1 Although the court used
the nature of the offense test 72 and examined a variety of col-
lateral consequences,73 it relied primarily on the maximum
61. Craner, 652 F.2d at 24. In addition to these penalties, court costs could
be assessed against the defendant. Id
62. Id at 25. The defendant's license could be revoked pursuant to the
governing California statute. Id
63. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930); see supra notes 43-
44 and accompanying text.
64. Craner, 652 F.2d at 26. The court also emphasized that Congress had
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to set only such a penalty and nothing
more severe. I&
65. Id. at 26-27.
66. 780 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986).
67. Id. at 473.
68. DWI offenses that occur on United States military bases are prose-
cuted in federal court pursuant to the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13
(1982). The Assimilative Crimes Act "adopts state law to define the elements
of the offense and to establish the appropriate range of punishment." United
States v. Sain, 795 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986). Thus, South Carolina law
governed Jenkins's case. The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 13 is to punish crimes
committed on federal bases in the same way they would be punished in the
surrounding jurisdictions. Id. The Sain court determined that application of
state law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 13 does not include applying the state's law
regarding the right to a jury trial. Id.
69. Jenkins, 780 F.2d at 473 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-5-2940, 56-5-2990
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). The mandatory minimum penalty was either a 48-
hour jail term or 48 hours' community service. Id.
70. Id. at 474.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 475.
73. Id- The statutory penalties and collateral consequences the court ex-
amined included the mandatory minimum penalty, community service, a treat-
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statutory penalty test.74
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Sain,75 reviewed a
DWI conviction under Oklahoma law, which provided only one
statutory penalty-a maximum fine of $300.76 The court, rely-
ing on a federal statute77 defining petty offenses as those with
penalties that do not exceed six months' imprisonment or a
$500 fine, held that the offense was not serious, and thus denied
the defendant the right to a jury trial.78
The Fifth Circuit considered a DWI defendant's habeas
corpus petition in Landry v. Hoepfner (Landry J).79 The Loui-
siana DWI statute mandated a minimum penalty 0 and pro-
vided for maximum penalties of a six-month imprisonment, a
$500 fine, participation in a substance-abuse program,81 and a
sixty-day license suspension.82 The court determined that DWI
was a serious offense based on the variety of statutory penal-
ties, public hostility toward drunk drivers, and the economic
costs of a conviction. 3 The en banc Fifth Circuit opinion, Lan-
dry v. Hoepfner (Landry 1),84 however, reversed85 because the
possible imprisonment did not exceed six months86 and DWI
was not an offense indictable at common law. 7
The disagreement in the federal and state courts88 concern-
ment program, license suspension, and the national public attitude toward
DWI. Id.
74. Id,
75. 795 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986). The right to a jury trial was only one of
several issues the circuit court decided. See id. at 890-92; supra note 68.
76. Sain, 795 F.2d at 890 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 761 (1981)).
77. Id. at 891 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1982)).
78. Id.; see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
79. 818 F.2d 1169, 1171 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), petition for cerL filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH).
80. Id. (providing for mandatory two-day jail term or four days of commu-
nity service).
81. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 (West 1984)).
82. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:414 (West 1984)).
83. Id. at 1174-77.
84. 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert. filed,
U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH).
85. The dissent in Landry II adopted the majority opinion in Landry L
Id. at 1220 (Garza, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1209.
87. Id.
88. Compare Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam)
(finding no right to trial by jury for DWI), City of Monroe v. Wilthite, 255 La.
838, 841-42, 233 So. 2d 535, 536 (no jury right), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970),
State v. Lynch, 223 Neb. 849, 856-57, 394 N.W.2d 651, 658-59 (1986) (no jury
right), Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623, 633, 748 P.2d 494,
501 (1987) (no jury right), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988), State v. Morrill,
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ing DWI demonstrates both that the courts have been unable to
clearly distinguish serious and petty offenses and that the
courts have failed to apply consistent standards in determining
the right to a jury trial.89 Courts have not satisfactorily decided
the relative importance of the statutory penalties,90 the com-
mon-law tests,91 or the collateral consequences9 2 as applied to
DWI offenses. A consistent, fair determination of the right to
trial by jury for DWI defendants requires an analysis of each of
these criteria.
III. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL APPLIES
TO DWI DEFENDANTS
A. THE STATUTORY PENALTIES
In its recent opinions considering the right to a jury trial,so
including Baldwin,94 the Supreme Court has established that
the maximum possible statutory penalty95 is the most impor-
123 N.H. 707, 712, 465 A.2d 882, 885 (1983) (no jury right), State v. Rodgers, 91
N.J.L. 212, 214-16, 102 A. 433, 434-35 (1917) (no jury right), and City of Albu-
querque v. Arias, 64 N.M. 337, 338, 328 P.2d 593, 594 (1958) (no jury right) with
Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 47, 410 P.2d 479, 486 (1966) (en
banc) (jury right), State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 39, 45, 704 P.2d 883, 886-87 (1985)
(jury right), Fisher v. State, 305 Md. 357, 365-66, 504 A.2d 626, 630-31 (1986)
(per curiam) (jury right), State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 441, 443-44, 98 N.W.2d
813, 817-19 (1959) (jury right), and Parham v. Municipal Court, 86 S.D. 531,
538, 199 N.W.2d 501, 505 (1972) (jury right); cf State v. Dickson, 9 Kan. App.
2d 425, 426, 680 P.2d 313, 315 (1984) (holding DWI serious when one-year im-
prisonment possible).
Three federal district courts have found that DWI is a serious offense,
even when punishable by fewer than six months' imprisonment. See Bronson
v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, 1100-01 (D. Nev. 1986); United States v. Woods,
450 F. Supp. 1335, 1348-49 (D. Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 5, 10 (S.D.
Ohio 1976). One federal district court has found DWI to be a petty offense.
See United States v. Fletcher, 505 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (W.D. Va. 1981); see also
supra note 14 (laying out disagreement of federal circuit courts over designa-
tion of DWI as petty or serious).
89. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (stating that "bound-
aries of the petty offense category have always been ill-defined, if not ambula-
tory"); United States v. Stewart, 568 F.2d 501, 502 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating that
"task of delineating petty and serious offenses is not an easy one"); 4 R. ER-
WIN, supra note 11, § 37.02, at 37-5 (noting that "distinction between serious
and petty offenses remains unclear," particularly in DWI cases).
90. See supra notes 28-35; infra notes 93-137 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 36-47; infra notes 138-66 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 48-52; infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 28.
94. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
95. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
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tant factor for determining the right to trial by jury.96 For the
majority of offenses in most jurisdictions, imprisonment is the
most significant statutory penalty. The offense of drunk driv-
ing, however, is unique, because DWI statutes usually embrace
a wide variety of other penalties.97 Therefore, consideration of
imprisonment alone is not sufficient for a consistent, fair deter-
mination of whether a DWI defendant has the right to a jury
trial.
1. Baldwin's Bright-Line Test
The statutory imprisonment penalty often is an accurate
reflection of the seriousness of an offense, because imprison-
ment for any length of time can have serious consequences.98
Many state legislatures have determined that DWI deserves a
significant period of possible imprisonment,99 making the seri-
ousness of the offense clear in these jurisdictions.100 Even if
the period of potential imprisonment does not exceed six
months, however, and thus does not automatically trigger the
jury right under Baldwin,1 1- courts still should consider the se-
verity of the possible imprisonment in connection with other
factors.-0 2
The Tenth Circuit in Sain, however, refused to consider
any criteria beyond imprisonment, holding that the maximum
statutory imprisonment should be the sole consideration when
96. See supra note 30.
97. See Appendix, infra; see also infra notes 113-37 and accompanying
text (discussing statutory penalties other than imprisonment).
98. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) ("the prospect of
imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused
as a trivial or 'petty matter' ").
99. See Appendix, infra (22 states provide for more than six months' pos-
sible imprisonment and 16 states allow six months).
100. Since Baldwin, no court has denied the right to a jury trial when the
possible imprisonment exceeded six months. E.g., State v. Dickson, 9 Kan.
App. 2d 425, 426, 680 P.2d 313, 315 (1984) (DWI is serious offense and defend-
ant has right to jury trial when one year's imprisonment possible).
101. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
102. None of the defendants in Craner, Jenkins, Sain, or Landry faced the
possibility of imprisonment for more than six months. See Landry v.
Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (six months' possible imprisonment), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH); United States v. Sain, 795 F.2d 888, 890
(10th Cir. 1986) (no imprisonment); United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 473
(4th Cir.) (30 days), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); United States v. Craner,
652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (six months); see also infra notes 123-37 and ac-
companying text (arguing that courts should consider other penalties together
with potential length of imprisonment).
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deciding whether to grant a DWI defendant the right to a jury
trial.103 Sain and similar federal and state opinions, holding
that a right to a jury trial for DWI does not exist unless statu-
tory imprisonment exceeds six months, have misinterpreted
Baldwin,10 4 criminal contempt cases,'0 5 or the federal statute
defining petty offenses106 as mandating petty offense classifica-
tion when the possible imprisonment is six months or less.10 7
Courts holding that an offense is petty because the possible im-
prisonment is six months or less are misguided, because the
Supreme Court has never held that imprisonment for less than
six months must result in an automatic classification of an of-
fense as petty. 08 Morever, the Court has never overruled or
103. The Sain court used criminal contempt cases and 18 U.S.C. § 1(3),
which defines as petty any offense for which the penalty does not exceed six
months' imprisonment or a $500 fine or both, as the only criteria for determin-
ing the right to trial by jury. Sain, 795 F.2d at 891; see infra note 112 and ac-
companying text. In addition, the Landry II court ruled that there are only
two tests to use when considering the right to a jury trial-possible imprison-
ment and whether the offense was indictable at common law. Landry v.
Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert filed
(U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH).
104. See infra note 107; see also supra notes 33-35; infra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text (arguing Baldwin is not only test for jury trial right
determination).
105. See infra note 107. The Supreme Court often emphasizes that crimi-
nal contempt is considered a petty offense. See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (noting that criminal contempt by nature is not serious
offense); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (same); Cheff v. Schnacken-
berg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (same). Criminal contempt cases therefore are
usually considered a separate line of authority. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note
35, § 371, at 296.
106. See infra notes 107, 112.
107. See, e.g., Landry II, 840 F.2d at 1207-09 (citing Baldwin and criminal
contempt case; court also considered indictable at common law test); Sain, 795
F.2d at 891 (holding that federal statute and criminal contempt cases set divid-
ing line); United States v. Fletcher, 505 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (W.D. Va. 1981)
(holding that federal statute and Baldwin were only criteria); State v. Webb,
335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976) (holding that Baldwin was only test); City of
Monroe v. Wilhite, 255 La. 838, 841, 233 So. 2d 535, 536 (1970) (relying on state
statute) cert denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970); Smith v. State, 17 Md. App. 217, 235-
36, 301 A.2d 54, 61 (1973) (holding that Baldwin was only test); Blanton v.
North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623, 632-33, 748 P.2d 494, 500 (1987)
(holding that Baldwin and criminal contempt cases set dividing line), cert
granted, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J. Super. 596, 599-600, 483
A.2d 844, 845 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (relying on criminal contempt
case and state law); cf. Matos v. Rodriguez, 440 F. Supp. 673, 676-77 (D.P.R.
1976) (holding that Baldwin was only criterion).
108. See Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1171-72 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that Baldwin test is not necessarily exclusive), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH);
United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that no member
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repudiated its own or lower court cases holding that certain of-
fenses for which the possible imprisonment does not exceed six
months nonetheless are serious.10 9 For example, in Colts1 0° the
Court held that reckless driving was a serious offense despite
only ninety days' possible imprisonment."1 1 Furthermore, the
Court's interpretation and the legislative history of the federal
statutory definition of petty offenses indicate that the definition
does not preclude a judicial determination of the right to a jury
trial for these offenses.112 Thus, federal and state courts that
rely solely on the length of possible imprisonment incorrectly
ignore the relevance of the other statutory penalties.
2. Statutory Penalties Other Than Imprisonment
All DWI statutes impose penalties in addition to imprison-
ment.113 The most common statutory penalty for a first-time
of Court ever stated that less than six months' imprisonment requires petty
classification); see also supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 33. In United States v. Thomas, 474 U.S. 873 (1985), de-
nying cert. to 753 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1984), acffg 574 F. Supp. 197 (D.D.C.
1983), for example, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to a
case in which the lower court had found the right to a jury trial, even though
the possible imprisonment did not exceed six months. See 574 F. Supp. at 198-
99. If Baldwin were the only criterion in the jury trial right determination,
the Supreme Court probably would have reversed the lower court's holding in
Thomas.
110. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
111. Id at 71, 73-74. By approving the nature of the offense test used in
Colts, the Baldwin Court :recognized the relevance of criteria other than the
duration of imprisonment. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 n.6
(1970).
112. A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1982), defines a federal petty of-
fense as "[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprison-
ment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both." In
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), however, the Supreme Court made it
clear that § 1(3) is not the sole definition of petty federal offenses. Id. at 475-
76 (no "talismanic significance" attaches to the federal statutory definition);
see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (noting court's responsi-
bility to make petty or serious distinction); Craner, 652 F.2d at 25 (noting that
bright-line test was not determinative). In addition, the legislative history of
§ 1(3) does not indicate that the statute was meant to define crimes for which
there was no right to trial by jury. See Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492,
494-95 (1937); Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Criminal Con-
tempt-The Right to Trial by Jury-Muniz v. Hoffman, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
549, 557-59.
113. All 50 states and the District of Columbia currently have statutes that
make it a criminal offense to operate a motor vehicle under the influence of
alcohol or other drugs. These statutes set a variety of penalties for the of-
fense. See Appendix, infra; NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY COMM'N,
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., DIGEST OF STATE ALCOHOL-HIGHWAY SAFETY RELATED
LEGISLATION (4th ed. 1986); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160
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DWI offender is imprisonment, in some states for as long as
two years." 4 In most jurisdictions the statutory punishment
for DWI also includes the revocation or suspension of the de-
fendant's driver's license for a period of two years or more.115
In some states the license suspension extends significantly be-
yond possible imprisonment" 6 and will have a more enduring
impact.117 Many people, and some courts, believe that license
revocation is the most severe punishment for the drunk
driver."8  In addition, most states permit a court to impose a
(1968) (noting that legislatures set penalties, but courts make distinction be-
tween petty and serious offenses).
114. See Appendix, infra (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas statutes
provide for two years' possible imprisonment; 17 other states provide for one-
year maximum).
115. See id. (32 states provide for possibility of at least six-month license
revocation, 49 states make such provision for first-time DWI offenders).
116. In South Carolina, the possible duration of imprisonment is only 30
days, while the license revocation may last six months. See United States v.
Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); see also
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a (1987) (authorizing three-month imprisonment,
one-year revocation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1988) (authorizing 30-day imprisonment, six-month revocation); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 63-11-30 (Supp. 1987) (authorizing one-day imprisonment, one
year maximum revocation); Appendix, infra (indicating that judges in most
states have much more discretion over term of imprisonment than period of
license revocation).
117. See State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J. Super. 596, 599-600, 483 A.2d 844, 845-46
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (possible 12-year revocation for third-time
DWI offender without right to trial by jury); see generally Hagen, Williams &
McConnell, Effectiveness of License Suspension or Revocation for Drivers
Convicted of Multiple Driving Under the Influence Offenses-An Overview of
Three Studies, 1 TRAFFIc SAFETY EVALUATION REs. REv. 13, 13-20 (1982) (eval-
uating effectiveness of license suspension as punishment of DWI offenders).
In addition, some states have placed restrictions on the restoration of the
driver's license. See, e.g., Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 278, 380 P.2d
136, 139 (1963) (en banc) (noting that statute requires driver to show financial
responsibility before license will be restored); Artis v. Rowland, 64 Wash. 2d
576, 580, 392 P.2d 815, 817 (1964) (en banc) (requiring proof of financial respon-
sibility and statement of compliance with license suspension); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 40-5-7(c)-(d) (1985) (requiring proof of insurance coverage and the retaking
of driving tests).
118. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 294, 309 (noting that
many people think period of revocation is too severe); W. MIDDENDORFF, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT: ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO TRAFFIC OF-
FENSES 103-06 (1968) (noting that community opinion regards loss of license as
serious punishment).
The Fifth Circuit in Landry I and the Ninth Circuit in Craner appear to
have viewed revocation as the most significant factor in granting the right to a
jury trial for DWI. See Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), :petition for cert . iled (U.S. June
13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH); United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir.
1981) ("the threat of loss of a license as important as a driver's license, a depri-
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significant fine for a DWI conviction.119 Some states also re-
quire substance-abuse treatment, educational programs,120 and
vation added to penal sanctions, is another sign that the [DWI] defendant's
community does not view [DWI] as a petty offense"). The Supreme Court has
recognized a due process property right that protects an individual's driver's
license. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 539 (1971).
Several lower courts, however, have held that driving a motor vehicle is a
privilege controlled by the state and thus have not considered the revocation
or suspension to be criminal punishment. See United States v. Jenkins, 780
F.2d 472, 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); United States v. Best,
573 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Coyle, 14 Ohio App. 3d 185, 186, 470
N.E.2d 457, 458 (1984); State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J. Super. 596, 601, 483 A.2d 844,
846 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1984); City of Tucumcari v. Briscoe, 58 N.M. 721, 722,
275 P.2d 958, 958 (1954); cf. Smith v. State, 17 Md. App. 217, 235, 301 A.2d 54, 64
(1973) (finding that legislative purpose of revocation is public safety and wel-
fare, not punishment). This rationale, however, ignores the necessity of motor
vehicles and driver's licenses in modern society. Many courts, recognizing this
necessity, consider the loss of a driver's license to be serious punishment. See,
e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that loss of driver's license "is more serious for some individuals than a
brief stay in jail"); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 44, 410 P.2d 479,
484-85 (1966) (en banc) ("the power to suspend the right to use the public
highways should be protected by the fundamental individual right to a trial by
jury"); State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 441-42, 98 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1959) ("revo-
cation of license may have grave consequences[:] . . . the motor vehicle has
clearly become a necessity to many people' "); Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226,
231, 139 A.2d 869, 872 (1958) ("use of the automobile [is] a necessary adjunct to
the earning of a livelihood in modern life"); see generally L. TAYLOR, DRUNK
DRIVING DEFENSE § 1.5.3, at 68 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing license revocation distin-
guishes DWI from petty offenses).
119. See Appendix, infra (24 states allow $1000 fine; Texas allows $2000;
Oregon allows $2500; Alaska, Indiana, and Pennsylvania allow $5000; Rhode Is-
land and North Dakota place no limit on amount of fine). Courts no longer
use the $500 fine test that Baldwin appeared to set for determining whether
the right to a jury trial exists. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 (1970).
In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o talismanic significance" is to
be accorded the $500 monetary fine limit on petty offenses. Muniz v. Hoffman,
422 U.S. 454, 477 (1976). "It is one thing to hold that deprivation of an individ-
ual's liberty beyond a six month term should not be imposed without the pro-
tections of a jury trial, but it is quite another to suggest that, regardless of the
circumstances, a jury is required where any fine greater than $500 is contem-
plated." Id. (finding no right to jury trial for 13,000-member union assessed
$10,000 fine).
Other financial penalties the state imposes can include court costs, a li-
cense reinstatement fee, mandatory tuition at treatment programs, and a legis-
latively imposed insurance premium. See Landry I, 818 F.2d at 1177; Craner,
652 F.2d at 26; State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J. Super. 596, 599, 601-02, 483 A.2d 844, 845-
46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
120. See Appendix, infra (in 46 states substance-abuse or educational pro-
gram is possible sanction); see also BusINEss & TRANSP. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, & HEALTH & WELFARE AGENCY, CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE, AN EVALUATION OF ALCOHOL ABUSE
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the performance of several days of community service. 2 1
Moreover, a majority of state statutes require courts to impose
a mandatory minimum jail term and other mandatory penalties
on the first-time DWI offender.122 Many experts consider the
penalties other than imprisonment to be the most substantial
and effective punishments for drunk drivers. 2 3 Thus, an analy-
sis that ignores or deemphasizes the potential consequences be-
yond imprisonment does not accurately reflect the seriousness
of the offense. A more appropriate inquiry would analyze the
severity of all the statutory penalties.2 4
TREATMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO DRIvERs LICENSE SUSPENSION OR REVOCA-
TION (1978) (studying 12-month treatment program for multiple-DWI
offenders).
121. See Appendix, infra (19 states provide community service as possible
penalty for first-time DWI offenders); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 18, 22
(urging community service, rehabilitation, and treatment programs for drunk
drivers).
122. See Appendix, infra (30 states have mandatory minimum jail term for
first-time DWI offenders, including five days in Colorado; seven days in Ne-
braska; 10 days in Georgia, Louisiana, and Oklahoma; 60 days in Delaware); see
also Daly & Kassekert, supra note 1, at 44 (39 states have mandatory jail term
for second DWI offense). Because this mandatory punishment distinguishes
DWI from most petty offenses, several courts recognize mandatory minimum
jail terms as a significant statutory punishment. See, e.g., Bronson v. Swinney,
648 IF. Supp. 1094, 1098-99 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding mandatory jail term distin-
guishes DWI from petty offenses); State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 39, 45, 704 P.2d
883, 886-87 (1985) (recognizing that mandatory imprisonment can lead to se-
vere economic and personal difficulties); Fisher v. State, 305 Md. 357, 367, 504
A.2d 626, 631 (1986) (holding that mandatory jail term for second offense is
reason for granting jury trial); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 18 (recom-
mending mandatory 100-hour community service or 48-hour jail term for first-
time DWI offender, 10-day mandatory jail term for second offense, and 120-day
mandatory jail term for subsequent offenses); L. TAYLOR, supra note 115,
§ 1.5.3, at 68 (discussing severity of consequences for DWI, including
mandatory jail term); Starr, supra note 5, at 35 (reporting 77% of Americans
favor mandatory jail term for first-time DWI offenders).
In addition to the mandatory jail term, most states also provide other
mandatory minimum penalties. See Appendix, infra (mandatory fines, license
suspension, community service, and treatment programs); see also 1 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 9, at 1080 (MADD encourages more strin-
gent laws requiring mandatory minimum punishment); REPORT, supra note 6,
at 18 (urging mandatory fines, jail terms, and license suspensions).
123. Because the drunk driver is not necessarily someone the public and
state wish to imprison for a long period of time, courts often impose other stat-
utory penalties. See, e.g., 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 11, § 2B.01, at 2B-1 ("The pos-
sible penalties facing the individual convicted of drunk driving are among the
most disparate in kind and the most susceptible to enhancement by legislative
fiat of those for any penal offense"); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 11, at
309 (discussing severity of license suspension).
124. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text; see also Landry v.
Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
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A repeat DWI offender not only faces the same variety of
statutory penalties as a first-time offender, but also faces the
potential of an enhanced sentence. 125 Nearly every jurisdiction
enhances the statutory penalties for a repeat DWI violation. 2 6
Conversely, states rarely enhance penalties for repeat crimes
other than DWI, 2 7 thus distinguishing DWI from the vast ma-
jority of offenses, many of which are deemed petty.12s
Enhanced penalties exceeding the Baldwin standard may
raise due process problems in repeat offender cases when the
courts have denied jury trials for the underlying offenses. The
Supreme Court has held that the enhancement of statutory
penalties violates the due process clause when the court did not
provide the right to counsel for the underlying conviction.129 A
consistent rationale would prevent enhancement of DWI penal-
ties beyond certain levels if the right to a jury trial had not
been provided for the underlying offenses.
Statutory enhancement can be particularly onerous in
some jurisdictions. Louisiana's DWI enhancement statute'3 0
1988) (en banc), petition for cert filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH)
(finding consideration of all consequences that courts may impose is appropri-
ate); Bronson, 648 F. Supp. at 1098 (stating court must look beyond maximum
authorized imprisonment); United States v. Thomas, 574 F. Supp. 197, 198-99
(D.D.C. 1983) (holding that court must consider imprisonment and impairment
of defendant's protest activity), aff'd, 753 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 873 (1985); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1346 n.12
(D. Md. 1978) (stating that court must consider all consequences); Brady v.
Blair, 427 F. Supp. 5, 9 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (giving consideration to community
opinion); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 44, 410 P.2d 479, 484
(1966) (en banc) (considering severity of total penalty).
125. In most states, the repeat DWI offense must occur within a certain
number of years of the first offense. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(h)
(1987) (repeat offense must occur within five years of first offense); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 484.3792 (1987) (repeat offense must occur within seven years of first
offense).
126. Forty-nine states (Oregon is the exception) provide for enhanced pen-
alties for repeated DWI offenses. See 4 R. ERWIN, supra note 11, § 33A-App.
(identifying increased penalties for each subsequent offense in each
jurisdiction).
127. See 1 id. § 2B.01, at 2B.1 (noting enhancement is more common for
DWI than other offenses).
128. See Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (D. Nev. 1986) ("sys-
tem of increasing penalties sets the offense of driving while intoxicated apart
from most offenses").
129. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222-24 (1980) (per curiam). In
Baldasar, the Court held that prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions may
not be used to enhance the penalties for subsequent violations. Id at 226; see
also State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. 1983) (holding prior un-
counseled DWI conviction cannot be used for enhancement).
130. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:98, 32:414 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
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presents an egregious example. A jury trial right is not pro-
vided for the first two DWI offenses.1 3 ' The third offense, how-
ever, is punishable by imprisonment for one to five years.132
The maximum imprisonment for the fourth DWI offense is for
thirty years, with a minimum sentence of ten years.133 Thus, in
Louisiana two prior convictions without a jury trial can provide
the basis to imprison an individual for thirty years for drunk
driving. Such a severe penalty raises serious due process
problems and distinguishes the DWI defendant from defend-
ants charged with petty offenses.
The variety of statutory punishments for DWI also often
increases the length of time that a court or state exercises con-
trol over the DWI defendant. Several federal and state courts
therefore distinguish DWI from the typical petty offense. 1'
Moreover, because state legislatures consider a variety of statu-
tory penalties to be the most effective punishment,135 and be-
cause courts actually impose penalties other than
imprisonment,136 courts also should focus on such penalties
when determining whether the right to a jury trial attaches.
131. See City of Monroe v. Wilhite, 255 La. 838, 841, 233 So. 2d 535, 536, cert
denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970); State v. Landry, 463 So. 2d 761, 764-65 (La. Ct. App.
1985), rev'd, Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No.
88-5043-CFH); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:98, 32:414 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 (West 1986).
133. Id.; see also inkfra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing harsh-
ness of other enhanced penalties); cf. Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court,
103 Nev. 623, 633, 748 P.2d 494, 501 (1987) (no right to jury trial for first DWI),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 484.379, 484.3792 (1987)
(one to six years' imprisonment for third DWI offense).
134. See supra notes 118, 128 and accompanying text. Several courts have
inquired into this wide variety of statutory penalties in determining whether
DWI is a petty or serious offense. See, e.g., Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169,
1175-77 (5th Cir. 1987) (considering educational program, substance abuse pro-
gram, and community service), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH); United States v.
Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 474-75 (4th Cir.) (considering mandatory assessment,
community service, education programs, automatic license suspension, and
possibility of increased insurance rates), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986);
United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding possible license
revocation indicates DWI is serious offense); Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp.
1094, 1099-1100 (D. Nev. 1986) (considering mandatory imprisonment, license
revocation, and enhanced penalties); State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 39, 44, 704 P.2d
883, 887 (1985) ("mix of punishments which apply once a driver has been
found guilty of drunk driving reflects the opprobrium with which the people
of this state view such activity").
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Little, Administration of Justice in Drunk Driving Cases, 58
A.B.A. J. 950, 952 (1972) (reporting Vermont study indicating 96% of DWI of-
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Although recent Supreme Court cases emphasize the impor-
tance of the potential term of imprisonment in determining the
right to a jury trial, the other statutory penalties for DWI may
be more severe.137 Courts thus should consider all the potential
statutory penalties to ensure the proper protection of the rights
of DWI defendants.
B. THE COMMON-LAw TESTS
Before the Supreme Court established that the statutory
penalties are the most relevant criteria for determining the
right to a jury trial, federal and state courts primarily applied
the common-law tests of the nature of the offense, whether the
offense was considered malum in se, and whether the offense
was indictable at common law.138 These tests focus on the
charged offense and, although never explicitly defined, are in
widespread use in the lower courts.139
The nature of the offense and malum in se tests rely on the
case-by-case judgment of a court to determine whether a partic-
ular offense is of a grave character or njorally offensive.140 Be-
cause the courts traditionally have regarded the violation of
liquor statutes as involving moral turpitude' 41 and because the
public in general condemns drunk driving,142 some courts have
determined that DWI is a serious offense under the nature of
the offense test.143 At common law, voluntary intoxication'"
fenders served no jail time, despite two-year possible imprisonment, but noting
that courts always imposed license suspension).
137. See, e.g., Jenkins, 780 F.2d at 474-75 (providing for only 30-day impris-
onment but adding several other statutory penalties).
138. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937) (ap-
plying nature of the offense and indictable at common law tests); District of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (applying nature of the offense, indict-
able at common law, and malum in se tests); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S.
65, 68 (1904) (applying nature of the offense test); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540, 555-57 (1888) (applying nature of the offense and indictable at common
law tests).
139. See supra notes 37, 42, and 46.
140. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. Because the Supreme
Court has never specified what the characteristics of a morally offensive crime
are, courts must make a case-by-case determination. Some courts have found
public attitudes helpful in setting moral standards for the nature of the of-
fense test. See United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); infra note 172.
141. See Note, supra note 37, at 120.
142. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 44, 410 P.2d 479,
485 (1966) (en banc) (noting that DWI is morally offensive to public); Fisher v.
State, 305 Md. 357, 367, 504 A.2d 626, 631 (1986) (per curiam) (noting serious-
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and nuisance on the highway 4 5 were malum in se offenses.14
Because of the similarity of DWI to these offenses, the destruc-
tive nature of DWI,147 and the community's low opinion of DWI
defendants, 48 several courts also have ruled that DWI is ma-
lir in se.149 Although the malum in se test retains vitality in
the lower courts,'5 0 the Supreme Court has not used the test
since 1930.151 Additionally, whether DWI involves moral turpi-
tude is open to debate.152
DWI was not indictable at common law when the United
States Constitution was adopted.153 The common law, however,
ness of DWI is shown by terrible consequences and public attitudes); State v.
Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 441, 98 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1959) (stating that DWI is of
serious nature).
144. See Note, supra note 42, at 81.
145. See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (reckless driv-
ing "is not merely malur, prohibitum but in its very nature is malum in se").
The Ninth Circuit, in examining the seriousness of DWI, stated that "[t]here is
no legally meaningful distinction between the present case and Colts." United
States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir. 1981).
146. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. Because of the significant
risk of death, injury, and highly destructive results, courts should regard DWI
as an innately reprehensible act according to the Landry I court. See Landry
v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH).
148. See supra note 10; infra note 173.
149. Because operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is extremely dan-
gerous, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text, whether it is prohibited by
law or not, see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text, some courts have re-
garded DWI as malum in se. See, e.g., Landry I, 818 F.2d at 1176 (holding DWI
"is truly malum in se"); Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (D. Nev.
1986) (not hesitating to classify DWI as malum in se); United States v. Woods,
450 F. Supp. 1335, 1348 (D. Md. 1978) (same); United States v. Barner, 195 F.
Supp. 103, 108 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (stating drunk driver "is guilty of an innately
reprehensible act, which every reasonable person would decry"); Parham v.
Municipal Court, 86 S.D. 531, 538, 199 N.W.2d 501, 505 (1972) (holding DWI
must be considered malum in se); Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 636-37, 299
S.W. 803, 804 (1927) (DWI is malum in se).
150. See supra note 42.
151. A LEXIS search suggests that District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S.
63 (1930), is the only right to jury trial case in which a Supreme Court major-
ity has used this test (LEXIS search terms: "mal! prohibit!" or "mal! in se"
w/50 "jury trial," LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. file).
152. See Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that DWI is apparently malum proibitum and not morally offensive);
Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. 1965) (holding DWI does not involve
moral turpitude).
153. Because no motor vehicles existed at the time of the adoption of the
United States Constitution, DWI could not have existed as an indictable of-
fense. See Colts, 282 U.S. at 73; Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1205 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-
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did deem the operation while intoxicated of a vehicle such as a
carriage to be an indictable offense.'5 In Colts, 155 the Supreme
Court found reckless driving to be sufficiently similar to reck-
less driving of carriages and nuisance on the highway 56 to in-
voke the right to trial by jury. 5 7 As a result, some lower courts
have inquired whether related offenses were indictable at com-
mon law. 58 Because of the highly destructive nature of the
modern motor vehicle,159 common-law crimes such as public
drunkenness are not closely analogous to drunk driving,160 but
some federal and state courts have found substantial similari-
ties between DWI and reckless driving or nuisance on the high-
way.'-6  These courts therefore afford the DWI defendant the
CFH); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1342-45 (D. Md. 1978);
Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 43, 410 P.2d 479, 486 (1966) (en
banc); Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam); Fisher v.
State, 305 Md. 357, 365, 504 A.2d 626, 630 (1986) (per curiam); State v. Morrill,
123 N.H. 707, 712, 465 A.2d 882, 885 (1983); State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212, 212,
102 A. 433, 434 (1917); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 13, at 928 (noting
that liquor and highway-related violations were tried without jury at common
law).
154. See Colts, 282 U.S. at 73.
155. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
156. Colts, 282 U.S. at 73 (reckless driving "was an indictable offense at
common law, . . . when horses, instead of gasoline constituted the motive
power") (citation omitted). But cf. supra note 153 (cases finding DWI not an
indictable offense). Nuisance on the highway was indictable at common law.
See State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212, 212, 102 A. 433, 433 (1917); Note, supra
note 142, at 75. Nevertheless, other courts have questioned whether reckless
driving and nuisance on the highway were in fact indictable at common law.
See United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); supra note 153.
157. See Colts, 282 U.S. at 73.
158. See Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 42, 47, 410 P.2d 479,
483, 486 (1966) (en banc) (looking for offenses similar to DWI); State v. Supe-
rior Court, 121 Ariz. 174, 176, 589 P.2d 48, 50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
shoplifting is sufficiently related to common-law crime of larceny to warrant
jury trial); State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 39, 42, 704 P.2d 883, 886 (1985) (finding
DWI akin to reckless driving, which was indictable at common law). But see
United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1333, 1345 (D. Md. 1978) (rejecting re-
lated-offense argument for DWI).
159. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1345 (D. Md. 1978); State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 39, 43,
704 P.2d 883, 886 (1985) ("The destructive capacity of the modern automobile
would make attempted analogies to intoxication offenses involving vehicles at
the time of adoption of the United States Constitution inapt.").
160. See O'Brien, 68 Haw. at 43, 704 P.2d at 886; see also Frankfurter &
Corcoran, supra note 13, at 982 (arguing that courts must give past history
present application).
161. See supra note 156.
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right to a jury trial under the indictable at common law test.162
These three common-law tests, however, are imprecise and
focus only on the offense charged, failing to take into account
punishment or other objective factors.163 The Supreme Court
has deemphasized these tests in relation to the statutory pen-
alty and has not used them to find a right to a jury trial for
more than fifty years.16 Moreover, whether a particular of-
fense was indictable or morally offensive two hundred years
ago has little bearing on its current seriousness.16 Therefore,
even though the common-law tests can be used to indicate
DWI's seriousness, they fail to consider adequately either the
gravity with which the general public regards the offense or,
more importantly, the seriousness of the statutory penalties.166
C. THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Although the Supreme Court has never used the collateral
consequences 167 test, several Justices have stated that courts
should examine such consequences when determining whether
the right to a jury trial exists.168 Collateral consequences that
162. See O'Brien, 68 Haw. at 4243, 704 P.2d at 886. But see Landry v.
Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding DWI not indictable),
rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June
13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH); United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1981) (same); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 42, 410 P.2d 479,
483 (1966) (en banc) (same); supra note 153 (related cases).
163. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (seeking objec-
tive criteria); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969) ("In determining
whether a particular offense can be classified as 'petty,' this Court has sought
objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the of-
fense."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (stressing need to refer
to objective criteria); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1939)
(declaring need for objective standards).
164. Colts, in 1930, was the last Supreme Court case in which the Court
found a right to a jury trial based upon the common-law tests. District of Co-
lumbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
165. Cf. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 627 ("those standards of action and of policy
which find expression in the common and statute law may vary from genera-
tion to generation"). In earlier right to trial by jury cases, the Supreme Court
used one or more of the common-law tests, see supra notes 36-47 and accompa-
nying text, but the Court has shifted the focus to statutory penalties in more
recent cases, see Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68-70; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-61; supra
note 30.
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 26.
168. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. These Justices cite Craner,
Brady, and Woods as leading examples of cases that considered a variety of
factors and collateral consequences. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 762-
63 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
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can result from a DWI conviction include financial costs such as
increased insurance premiuns,169 retesting for a new driver's li-
cense, the need to use alternative transportation, attorney's
fees, tuition in treatment programs, 170 and loss of employment
or wages.?71 Moreover, in recent years the public's disdain of
drunk driving has increased dramatically,"72 largely because of
the efforts of citizens' groups such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving.173 Other social stigmas, such as that caused when a lo-
cal newspaper prints the names of those convicted of DWI,174
can also result from a DWI conviction. Several lower courts,
169. See, e.g., Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987) (con-
sidering "serious economic repercussions, such as an increase in insurance pre-
miums"), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert filed
(U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH). But see State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J. Super.
596, 601-02, 483 A.2d 844, 845-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (holding that
legislatively-mandated insurance surcharge was not significant).
170. See Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (D. Nev. 1986) (hold-
ing tuition for and attendance at substance abuse classes are significant collat-
eral consequences).
171. See 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 11, § 2B.01, at 23-1; see also Rubenstein,
supra note 4, at 11 (reporting $5000 average cost in Minnesota for fines, attor-
ney's fees, license reinstatement, and increased insurance cost).
172. See supra notes 9-10. The more than 50% increase in DWI arrests and
the enactment of laws with more stringent penalties indicates changing public
attitudes toward DWI. See supra notes 7-8.
Although the Supreme Court never formalized community attitudes as a
criterion, the Court occasionally examines such attitudes toward an offense
when determining whether it is petty or serious. See District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937). Considering community attitudes may be
helpful in determining the right to a jury trial, but the Court traditionally con-
siders community attitudes as part of either the nature of the offense test or as
an indicator reflected by the statutory penalty. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 160 (1968); Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628 (examining "the laws and prac-
tices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments");
supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
173. The 600,000 members of MADD, the largest of these groups, include
victims of drunk-driving accidents and other concerned citizens. The members
engage in a wide variety of activities, including speaking to community and
business groups and lobbying legislatures and courts in an effort to eradicate
the drunk-driving problem. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, supra note
9, at 1080; see also Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1246 (4th Cir. 1985) (in-
volvement of MADD was aid in prosecution); Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz.
513, 519, 667 P.2d 213, 219 (1983) (MADD filed amicus brief); State v. Mc-
Naught, 238 Kan. 567, 577, 713 P.2d 457, 467 (1986) (MADD members attended
DWI trial); see generally Starr, supra note 5, at 36-39 (discussion of MADD's
activities).
174. See Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, 1099-1100 (D. Nev. 1986)
(noting that names of convicted drunk drivers are regularly published in
newspapers); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-3000 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)
(mandating publication by state of names of all who had their licenses sus-
pended for DWI).
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especially in DWI cases, have considered the collateral conse-
quences related to a conviction 175 and, as a result, have held
that DWI is not analogous to other petty offenses.
176
Although collateral consequences undoubtedly have a sig-
nificant impact on many DWI defendants, courts should not
consider them when determining whether the defendant may
invoke the right to a jury trial.177 Because collateral conse-
quences are not state-imposed statutory penalties, granting the
right to a jury trial will not protect a defendant from these con-
sequences. Moreover, collateral consequences exist to some ex-
tent for virtually all criminal offenses. For example, insurance
costs can increase for any driving violation.178 In addition,
although some other offenses carry as much public opprobrium
as a DWI conviction, social stigma is not considered relevant in
the determination of the right to jury trial for those offenses.179
Furthermore, collateral consequences are speculative in nature,
175. See, e.g., Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 5, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (noting that
DWI conviction may have substantial impact on defendant's financial re-
sources, travel, and occupation, as well as liberty); State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw.
39, 44, 704 P.2d 883, 887 (1985) (holding that collateral punishments were not
minor); Parham v. Municipal Court, 86 S.D. 531, 537, 199 N.W.2d 501, 504
(1972) (holding it proper to consider collateral consequences); see also supra
note 50 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir. 1987)
(drunk driving presents devastating social problem), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-
CFH); Brady, 427 F. Supp. at 10 (holding consequences make DWI serious of-
fense); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 44, 410 P.2d 479, 485 (1966)
(en banc) (noting DWI is repugnant to community); O'Brien, 68 Haw. at 44,
704 P.2d at 887 (noting drunk driving is viewed with opprobrium).
Some courts that examine collateral consequences have grouped them
with the statutory penalties without acknowledging that they were considering
penalties beyond the statutory provisions. See Landry I, 818 F.2d at 1175;
United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir. 1981); supra note 26.
177. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (discouraging consid-
eration of collateral consequences). Although collateral consequences are not
especially helpful in analyzing whether a charge of DWI gives rise to a right to
trial by jury, this criterion may be more helpful in other circumstances, such
as when competing federal constitutional interests exist. See United States v.
Thomas, 574 F. Supp. 197, 198-99 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding infringement of first
amendment rights), aff'd, 753 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
873 (1985).
178. See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1216 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane),
petition for cert filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH).
179. See Landry II, 840 F.2d at 1216 (noting that economic repercussions
and public opprobrium are also common for crimes other than DWI). Of the
recent non-DWI cases finding a right to a jury trial when the imprisonment
did not exceed six months, see supra note 34, only one dealt with collateral
consequences, see Thomas, 574 F. Supp. at 199.
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because courts cannot determine with any consistency when
and if they will occur, especially in the context of society's con-
tinually shifting moral values.'80 Conversely, statutory penal-
ties are objective and apply to all offenders and thus are a
better gauge of community opinion.' 8 ' Finally, because of the
great diversity in community and judicial attitudes, 8 2 and be-
cause of the speculative nature of collateral costs, courts cannot
rely on collateral consequences in establishing uniform stan-
dards for determining the right to trial by jury for DWI
defendants.
IV. A PROPOSED METHOD FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER A DWI DEFENDANT HAS THE
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
Because DWI is not sufficiently analogous to common-law
crimes, and because there can be a wide variation in collateral
consequences and public and judicial attitudes, consideration of
nonstatutory criteria interferes with a focused and objective ap-
plication of the statutory penalties criteria. Courts should focus
on the full range of potential statutory penalties to determine
whether the right to a jury trial exists. 8 3 By examining to-
gether all the potential statutory penalties for DWI, especially
imprisonment, penalty enhancement for repeat offenders, li-
cense revocation, and mandatory minimum jail terms, courts
could develop objective guidelines that would accurately reflect
the seriousness of the DWI penalty.'84
180. See Landry II, 840 F.2d at 1209-10 (stating that public view of offense
is subjective and imprecise). Allowing public attitudes and the courts' moral
judgments to influence the decision creates an undesirable inconsistency, be-
cause what one court or community considers a serious offense may be a petty
offense in the next town. Conversely, a statutory penalty analysis will keep
criteria consistent within each jurisdiction. See District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1937) (noting that seriousness of penalties varies
by generation); cf. supra note 88 (citing conflicting cases).
181. See supra notes 30, 163 (discussing statutory penalty as most impor-
tant and objective factor); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161
(1968) (discussing importance of statutory penalty as objective criterion).
182. See Landry II, 840 F.2d at 1209-10.
183. In Duncan, the Supreme Court implied that the proper approach is to
focus on all of the statutory punishments. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 ("In deter-
mining whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of
other punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial, we are counseled
... to refer to objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the
Nation."). Two of the best examinations of the variety of statutory penalties
imposed upon the DWI defendant are Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094
(D. Nev. 1986) and State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 39, 704 P.2d 883 (1985).
184. See supra note 163.
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When possible imprisonment does not exceed six months
and thus does not fall within the Baldwin test,'l8 5 courts should
examine closely all the statutory penalties. For instance, if the
statute provides for both a mandatory jail term and mandatory
license revocation, courts should find the right to a jury trial.186
If possible license revocation, enrollment in a treatment pro-
gram, community service, or other restriction on the defend-
ant's freedom extends beyond six months, the defendant also
should have a constitutional right to a jury trial. 8 7 When the
possible term of imprisonment is short, but a conviction carries
other significant penalties, such as a fine exceeding $1000,18
courts should find that defendants have the right to a jury trial.
When the enhanced penalties for repeat offenses exceed any of
these guidelines, or the Baldwin standard, courts either should
find the right to a jury trial for the underlying offense or
should refuse to consider the prior conviction in imposing pen-
alties for subsequent convictions.'8 9
In cases where the DWI statute provides for multiple and
185. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
186. When jail time is mandatory, the right to counsel must be invoked.
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); supra note 122 (discussing
mandatory penalties for DWI); supra notes 115, 119 (discussing states with rev-
ocations for more than six months or fines exceeding $1000); Appendix, infra
(mandatory jail terms).
187. An imprisonment penalty greater than six months invokes the right
to a jury trial, as should other restrictions on the defendant's freedom that ex-
ceed six months.
188. Although the Supreme Court apparently has abandoned Baldwin's
bright-line test that considers fines over $500, see supra note 119, some line
should be maintained for fines imposed on individuals, see United States v.
Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (fine exceeding $500 for
individuals invokes jury trial right); see also Appendix, infra (only five states
have fines for DWI that exceed $1000).
189. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text; see also State v. Lin-
nehan, 197 N.J. Super. 41, 43-44, 484 A.2d 34, 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) (holding that enhancement to ten-year license revocation was insuffi-
cient to require right to jury trial). The enhanced penalties in many jurisdic-
tions can become quite serious. For instance, permanent license revocation is
possible in some states. See 4 R. ERWIN, supra note 11, § 33A-App-2. In addi-
tion, license revocation for at least three years is possible in several others. Id
Fines for repeat offenses also increase to $2500 in Alabama and $5000 in Ten-
nessee. Id. Finally, the term of imprisonment greatly increases, subjecting re-
peat DWI offenders to one to six years in Arkansas, a 120-day mandatory
minimum in California, one to five years in Idaho, a five-year maximum in
Missouri, one to six years in Nevada, a one-year minimum in Pennsylvania,
and a two-year minimum in South Dakota. Id. Thus, if the right to a jury trial
does not exist with the first DWI offense and enhanced imprisonment does not
exceed six months, other substantial enhanced penalties may activate the jury
trial right.
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enhanced penalties, none of which alone exceeds the suggested
limits, courts should consider the cumulative effect of the pen-
alties.190 As the possible imprisonment approaches the Bald-
win six-month standard,' 91 only a few additional statutory
penalties should be necessary to trigger the right to trial by
jury. For example, a DWI statute that imposes a six-month im-
prisonment and a fine, combined with license revocation or any
other statutory penalty, should result in the defendant having
the right to a jury trial.
A. RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSAL
The proposed method of analysis would extend the federal
constitutional right to a jury trial to more DWI defendants.
Given the large number of drunk-driving arrests, the proposal
potentially could create significant administrative problems. 92
Many jurisdictions, however, already grant the right to a jury
trial to all DWI defendants 93 and have not withdrawn the
right because of backlog, costs, or other administrative
problems. 94 Because many DWI defendants plead guilty' 95 or
waive their right to a jury trial,'196 administrative problems are
not especially prohibitive. Furthermore, administrative expedi-
ency is not a compelling governmental interest that overrides
190. Courts should consider the cumulative weight of all the state-imposed
statutory penalties, emphasizing imprisonment, license revocation, and
mandatory penalties, rather than simply considering whether each penalty in-
dividually activates the right to a jury trial.
191. See supra note 32; infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 4 (noting 1.8 million DWI arrests in a given year).
193. See supra note 20; see also Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1217-19
(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-
5043-CFH). One feared response to the administrative problems is that state
legislatures may consider reducing the statutory punishments to prevent
courts from granting a jury trial right to all DWI defendants. See infra notes
194-97 and accompanying text.
194. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968); cf Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38-39 n.9 (1972) (noting New York City study that indi-
cated only two percent of serious traffic offenders were jailed).
195. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 18, 25 (reporting 75%
guilty pleas, 10% bench trials, and 15% jury trials for major crimes); Starr,
supra note 5, at 35 (reporting that California permitted 80,000 defendants
charged with DWI to plead guilty to reckless driving in 1978).
196. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74 & n.22 (1970); United States
v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir. 1981); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note
11, at 18 n.12, 25 (noting that 99% of California traffic violations are disposed
of before trial); Little, supra note 136, at 951 (reporting Vermont study indicat-
ing that only two percent of DWI cases went to jury trials).
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constitutionally guaranteed individual rights.197 Consequently,
concerns about backlogging the courts with DWI defendants de-
manding a jury trial cannot justify the denial of this constitu-
tional right.
Consideration of all the potential statutory penalties, but
not the collateral consequences, would avoid the problem of
courts considering penalties that legislatures did not enact.
Moreover, such analysis would not affect legislative bodies,
which would remain free to set any penalties they deem neces-
sary.198 If a lenient sentence results because a legislature
chooses to limit the severity of the combined statutory punish-
ments, no right to a jury trial should attach.199 When the legis-
lature imposes a wide variety of significant statutory penalties,
however, courts should recognize the right to trial by jury.20 0
197. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 394 & n.13 (Alaska
1970) (stating that constitutional rights should not take secondary position to
expediency); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 44, 410 P.2d 479, 484
(1966) (en banc) (stating that expediency should not prevent right to trial by
jury for DWI defendants); City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 173-74,
323 P.2d 614, 616-17 (1958) (stating that individual dignity and rights are tram-
meled by resort to expediency); see also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 99
(1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that convenience should not stand in
the way of the right to trial by jury); cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344 (1963) (stating that court system is designed to assure fair trials before im-
partial tribunals, not efficiency). Although highway safety is a legitimate state
interest, cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1982) (finding legiti-
mate state interest in assigning penalties for refusal to take blood-alcohol
test), and increased enforcement and convictions may increase the overall de-
terrent effect, see Comment, Constitutional Issues Raised by the Civil-Crimi-
nal Dichotomy of the Maine OU Law, 35 ME. L. REV. 385, 395 n.35, 399-400,
403 (1983), a higher conviction rate, achieved more quickly, certainly would
not rise to the level of a compelling state interest.
198. See supra notes 11, 20. Other considerations, such as the eighth
amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, would prevent
outrageous penalties such as life imprisonment for DWI offenders. Legisla-
tures also should not circumvent the right to a jury trial by imposing multiple
penalties below the threshold level. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying
text.
199. See United States v. Sain, 795 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986) ($300 fine
is only statutory penalty); infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text. Prior to Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968), there was no Supreme Court case finding
the right to a jury trial based upon the authorized statutory penalty. Duncan
and Baldwin, however, have changed the focus of the Court's inquiry to statu-
tory penalties. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 71; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-61. None-
theless, the Supreme Court and lower courts recognize that some offenses are
serious even though possible imprisonment does not exceed six months. See
supra notes 14, 34, and 88.
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B. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Applying this proposed test still would not allow all DWI
defendants to have a jury trial. In Sain, for example, when the
maximum penalty was a fine of only $300,201 the court correctly
denied the defendant the right to a jury trial.202
In other jurisdictions, the possible penalties are so severe
that the right to a jury trial is unquestionable. In addition to
the twenty-two states that have imprisonment penalties that
exceed the Baldwin standard,20 3 fifteen states impose a possible
six-month imprisonment and additional penalties.20 4 In Louisi-
ana, for example, the DWI defendant faces numerous signifi-
cant statutory penalties, including license revocation, a fine,
community service, a substance-abuse program, a mandatory
minimum penalty, a possible six-month imprisonment,205 and
the potential for substantial enhanced penalties.206 Therefore,
the cumulative weight of the statutory penalties supports the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Landry I, not Landry 11.207
Between these two extremes, several jurisdictions have
statutes that present courts with more difficult analyses. 20 8
The facts of the Craner and Jenkins cases presented the ques-
tion of which statutory penalties are the most important-im-
201. The Sain Court did, however, rely exclusively on criminal contempt
cases and the federal statutory definition of petty offenses, thus abdicating the
jury trial right determination to the legislature and completely ignoring the
relevant case law as an additional basis for finding an offense to be serious.
Sain, 795 F.2d at 891; see supra notes 75-80; 103-12 and accompanying text.
202. The Oklahoma statute, which imposed only a $300 fine, was unusually
lenient. See Appendix, infra, for a survey of state penalties. See also Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 755 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (condemning
Wisconsin's DWI statute, which provided only a $300 fine).
203. See Appendix, infra.
204. See idi
205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:98, 32:414 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
206. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. Because the Landry I
court considered the full spectrum of statutory penalties, which are especially
harsh in Louisiana, see text accompanying notes 205-06, supra, its decision
more accurately reflects the seriousness of the statutory penalty than does the
Landry II opinion, which looked only at whether the offense was indictable at
common law and at the maximum possible imprisonment. Landry v.
Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1175-77 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc), petition for cert filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH);
Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 88-5043-CFH).
208. The task of line-drawing in the right to jury trial context "requires at-
taching different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line,
actually differ very little." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
[Vol. 73:122
JURY TRIAL RIGHT FOR DWI
prisonment, license revocation, enhancement, fines, or some
combination of these and other penalties. Although for most
offenses imprisonment is the primary punishment, in DWI
cases the statutory penalties other than imprisonment often are
the more significant punishment.20 9 Thus, as in Craner, when a
possible six-month license revocation is added to a possible six-
month imprisonment,210 the combination should be enough to
trigger the right to a jury trial. Similarly, with facts like those
in Jenkins-a six-month license revocation combined with a
possible thirty-day imprisonment, a fine, a mandatory mini-
mum penalty, and community service2 1 -- courts also should
recognize the right to a jury trial.
CONCLUSION
Federal and state courts are divided as to whether DWI is a
petty or serious offense for purposes of determining the federal
constitutional right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court and
most lower courts have used several different criteria to deter-
mine whether a crime such as DWI is petty or serious. The
common-law and collateral consequences criteria may indicate
the seriousness of DWI, but these tests are not objective and
therefore should not be determinative as to whether a DWI de-
fendant has the right to a jury trial.
Some courts emphasize the statutory imprisonment penalty
in determining whether the right to a jury trial exists. DWI,
however, presents a situation in which statutory penalties other
than imprisonment often impose the most significant punish-
ment. Courts therefore should consider all of the statutory
penalties and examine the cumulative effect of these penalties
on the DWI defendant, emphasizing imprisonment, license rev-
ocation, enhancement, and mandatory minimum jail terms. Be-
209. See supra notes 113-37 and accompanying text.
210. United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981); see supra notes
59-65 and accompanying text.
211. United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 473-74 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1161 (1986); see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. The Jen-
kins court considered various penalties under South Carolina's DWI statute,
but failed to place much weight on this wide variety of penalties. See Jenkins,
780 F.2d at 474-75; see also Landry II, 840 F.2d at 1209 (looking only at statu-
tory imprisonment penalty). Even though the Jenkins court correctly stated
that the statutory penalty is the most important factor, the Jenkins court and
the Landry II court did not believe license revocation, the possibility of en-
hancement, or community service should be significant factors in making the
jury trial right determination. See Landry II, 840 F.2d at 1209; Jenkins, 780
F.2d at 474.
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cause of the wide array of significant statutory penalties and
possible due process problems, courts in most cases should
classify DWI as a serious offense and therefore recognize the
right to trial by jury in DWI cases.
Douglas E. Lahammer
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1 Unless otherwise noted, the community service and courses and treat-
ment programs listed are mandatory.
2 The court may impose imprisonment or a fine or both. ALA. CODE § 32-
5A-191(c) (Supp. 1988).
3 A limited license may be granted after 30 days upon a showing of eco-
nomic hardship. ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.181(e)(3) (1984).
" Public service may be ordered in lieu of imprisonment or fine. ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5-65-111, 5-65-114 (1987). In addition, mandatory court costs of
$250 are imposed. Id § 5-65-115.
' A restricted license is available for employment-related purposes. Id.
§ 5-65-104(b)(1).
6 In lieu of the listed penalties, the court may grant probation (three-year
minimum), which would include mandatory participation in an alcohol educa-
tion program, a fine ($390-$1000), possible imprisonment (48 hours-six
months), and license restriction or suspension. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23161 (West
Supp. 1988).
' The mandatory jail term may be suspended upon satisfactory completion
of an alcohol program. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202(4)(c)(f1) (1984).
8 Mandatory court costs of $25 are imposed. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-
119(1)(c) (Supp. 1987).
' There also is a mandatory license restoration fee of $50. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 42-2-124 (1984).
10 The court may order either imprisonment and fine or community ser-
vice and license suspension. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(h) (1987).
"1 The court may suspend the period of imprisonment, or grant probation
in lieu of imprisonment and the fine. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 4177(f),
4177B(a) (1985).
1 If license revocation creates extreme hardship, a conditional license
may be granted by the court. Id § 4177E. A license reinstatement fee of $15
for suspended licenses and $125 for revoked licenses is required. Id §§ 2737,
2738. In addition, a person on probation may apply for a conditional license
after revocation if 16 hours of instruction or rehabilitation have been satisfac-
torily completed. Id § 4177C(a). Any person who has satisfactorily completed
a course of instruction or rehabilitation may reapply for a license six months
after revocation. Id § 4177C(b).
" The period of license revocation may be less than six months at the dis-
cretion of the Mayor or the Mayor's designated agent. D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-
302(b) (1986). After a conviction for DWI, vehicle registration or license may
also be suspended until proof of financial responsibility is shown. Id § 40-437.
14 Probation up to one year and a minimum of 50 hours community ser-
vice are mandatory. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(6)(a) (1987). The court will impose
an additional fine of $100 for this offense. Act of July 6, 1988, No. 88-381 § 60
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 363.193(6)).
15 Proof of financial responsibility and a license reinstatement fee is re-
quired for restoration of license. FLA. STAT. § 324.072 (1987). In addition, the
license may be temporarily restored if the defendant enrolls in and completes
a driver improvement course. Id. § 322.25(7).
16 The court may suspend, stay, or probate the period of imprisonment.
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 1988).
11 The driver's license may be reinstated after 120 days upon completion of
an approved alcohol course and payment of a $25 restoration fee. GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-5-70(b)(1)(A) (1985). The court may also require proof of insurance
coverage and the retaking of driving tests prior to reinstatement. Id. § 40-5-
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70(c)-(d). A limited driving permit may also be issued if suspension would cre-
ate extreme hardship. I& § 40-5-71.
18 See State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 39, 44 n.5, 704 P.2d 883, 887 n.5 (1985).
19 The court must sentence the defendant to one or more of the following.
the minimum jail term, a fine, or community service. HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-
4(b)(1)(C) (1985).
' In lieu of the 90-day suspension, the court may order a minimum sus-
pension of 30 days, followed by a license restriction for the remainder of the
90-day period. I&L § 291-4(b)(1)(B).
21 The court may allow restricted driving privileges on a defendant's show-
ing of need. IDAHO CODE § 18-8005(1)(d) (Supp. 1988).
' If alcohol evaluation indicates need for treatment, the court will order
treatment unless defendant proves it is not required. Id. § 18-8005(5).
' The court may allow a restricted license in hardship cases. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-206.1 (1987).
2 The maximum prison term and fine depend on severity of the misde-
meanor charged. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-50-3-2, 35-50-3-4 (Burns 1987).
' Depending on the DWI defendant's previous record and submission to a
chemical test, the court may waive the license suspension and grant probation-
ary driving privileges for 180 days. Id. § 9-11-3-1(b)(2).
' The court may order community service in lieu of the fine. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 321J.2(2)(a) (Supp. 1988). In addition, the court can defer the DWI sen-
tence and place the defendant on probation, but the license revocation cannot
be reduced below 30 days. Id. §§ 321J.4, 907.3. A civil penalty of $100 is also
imposed following license revocation. Id. § 321J.17. Moreover, the court has
discretion to issue a restricted driver's license. I& § 321J.20. The court may
order the defendant to install ignition interlock devices on all motor vehicles
operated by defendant. The devices prevent operation of the vehicles with an
illegal blood alcohol concentration. Act Relating to Judicial Sentencing, § 1
(July 1, 1988) (to be codified at IowA CODE § 321J.4(7)).
' The court may order either imprisonment or 100 hours of community
service. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567(d) (Supp. 1987). The court may also order
community service in lieu of a fine. Id. § 8-1567(h). An additional assessment
of $110 may also be required. Id. § 8-1008(e).
' In lieu of the one-year license suspension, the court may order a suspen-
sion for a period of 21 days or until completion of a required treatment pro-
gram. Thereafter, a limited license may be issued. I&. § 8-1567(d).
2 The court must assess at least one of these penalties. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 189A.010(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). A service fee of $150 is
assessed in all convictions. I&. § 189A.050(1).
' The period of license suspension may be reduced to 30 days if the de-
fendant successfully completes a driver improvement or an alcohol or treat-
ment program. Id- § 189A.70(1)(a).
31 The court must impose either the mandatory jail term or the commu-
nity service and a substance-abuse program, or a two-day jail term and sub-
stance-abuse and driver-improvement programs. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:98(B) (West 1986).
' In certain parishes an additional fine of $25 is imposed. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:98(J) (West Supp. 1988).
' A $60 license reinstatement fee is mandatory. IH. § 32:414(G)(1)(b). A
restricted license may be granted during period of suspension upon a showing
of economic hardship. I&. § 32:415:1.
' A person will be imprisoned if the blood alcohol level was .15% or
1988]
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more, and if he or she was either exceeding the speed limit by 30 miles or
more, or attempted to elude an officer. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312-
B(2)(B) (Supp. 1988).
' The Secretary of State may suspend licenses for an additional period of
up to 135 days. Id, § 1312-D(1-A). Suspension may be reduced or limited
licenses granted upon completion of an alcohol education or treatment pro-
gram. Id. § 1312-D(2)-(3).
' The minimum revocation for driving while intoxicated is six months,
while the maximum suspension for driving under the influence of alcohol is 60
days. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 16-205, 16-208(b) (1987).
7 The court in its discretion may grant probation with mandatory treat-
ment in lieu of these penalties. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 90, §§ 24(1), 24D, 24E (1986).
The court may also order that the defendant only be imprisoned on weekends
or evenings. Id § 24(1)(a)(3).
3 A restricted driver's license can be issued that permits the defendant to
drive to and from work or other limited activities. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 257.625(4) (Supp. 1988). The court may also order the installation of ignition
interlock devices on all vehicles operated by defendant. Id
'The court may impose imprisonment or a fine or both. MINN. STAT.
§ 609.03(3) (Supp. 1987). A stay of execution may be granted for a maximum
of two years if the defendant undergoes alcohol treatment. MINN. STAT.
§§ 169.121(5), 609.135(2) (1986 & Supp. 1987).
' The court may grant a limited license. Id. § 171.30. Upon reinstatement
of a revoked license, a $200 fee is assessed. MINN. STAT. § 171.29(2)(b) (Supp.
1987).
41 The period of license suspension or revocation may be reduced to a min-
imum of 45 days in hardship cases, with a restricted license for the next 45
days or until the alcohol safety education program is completed. Mss. CODE
ANN. § 63-11-37(2) (Supp. 1987).
' A suspended sentence with two years of probation may be imposed -in
lieu of imprisonment. Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.010(2) (Supp. 1988).
41 In addition, 60 days of restricted driving privileges are imposed follow-
ing the suspension period. Id §§ 302.304(4), 302.525(2). Furthermore, a $25 re-
instatement fee and the completion of education programs are required before
a driver's revoked license will be reinstated. Id § 577.520.
4The maximum imprisonment for driving with excessive blood alcohol
concentration (greater than .10%) is 10 days. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-722(1)
(1987).
" The minimum license suspension will apply if either probation or a sus-
pended sentence is granted. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (Supp. 1987).
46 The court may order either imprisonment or community service. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 484.3792(1)(a) (1987). A one- to three-year period of treatment
will postpone final sentencing. Id § 484.3794(4). After successful treatment,
the offender may not be sentenced to more than one day in jail or 24 hours of
community service, or a $200 fine, or both. Id
' In addition to any other penalty, the defendant must pay a $35 civil pen-
alty. Id § 484.3791.
48 In addition, the court must impose a $100 surcharge. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-50.8 (West Supp. 1988).
' The court can impose imprisonment or a fine or both. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 66-8-102(D) (Supp. 1988). If the sentence is suspended, a 90-day to three-year
period of probation must be imposed. Id
' The statute does not specify the period of revocation for DWI, but for a
lesser intoxicated-driving offense the revocation is for 90 days and for a repeat
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DWI offense the minimum revocation is for one year. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 51v (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
"1 The term of imprisonment can be suspended if the court imposes com-
munity service, license revocation, or probation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(i)
(Supp. 1987). The alcohol education program and community service alterna-
tives require a $100 fee. Id § 20-179.2(c). If alcohol education is not com-
pleted, a 12-month license revocation must be imposed. Id. § 20-16A(b).
Limited driving privileges can also be granted. Id. § 20-179.3.
5 The state has a point system which determines the period of license sus-
pension. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10 (Supp. 1987). A first-time DWI offense
with no prior driving violations would result in a 91-day license suspension.
ICE
' The court may suspend the term of imprisonment and place the of-
fender on probation and require attendance at a driver intervention program.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
' A restricted license is available upon a showing of necessity. Id
§ 4507.16(D).
' The court can suspend the sentence upon the defendant's completion of
the substance-abuse treatment course. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902.2 (Supp.
1987), amended by Act of June 24, 1988, No. 88-556.
' Act of June 24, 1988, No. 88-556 (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47,
§ 6-205.1). The defendant must pay a license reinstatement fee of $150. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 47, § 6-212.11(B) (Supp. 1987).
1 The court must order either 48 hours' jail time or community service, in
addition to a fine and an alcohol examination. OR. REV. STAT. § 813.020 (1987).
A $175 court fee is also imposed. Id. § 813.030.
59 The court must impose the imprisonment penalty or community service
or both. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2(d)(1) (Supp. 1987).
o Public service may be ordered in lieu of the mandatory jail term. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-5-2940(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
61 A provisional driver's license may be issued during the period of sus-
pension, but proof of financial responsibility is required. Id. § 56-1-1320. The
provisional driver's license option also includes a mandatory alcohol safety
program. Id. § 56-1-1330.
' The defendant must pay a $50 license reinstatement fee. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 32-12-48 (Supp. 1988). The court may, in its discretion, issue an
order permitting the defendant to operate a motor vehicle for purposes of the
defendant's employment or attendance at court-ordered counseling programs.
Id- § 32-23-2.
' If the sentence imposed is less than the maximum, the defendant must
serve the duration of the maximum on probation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-
403(c) (Supp. 1988). In addition, the defendant will be required to participate
in an alcohol safety program. Id.
I The court has discretion to allow restricted use of the driver's license.
Id, § 55-7-502(d).
' The court must impose either the mandatory jail time or the commu-
nity service. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1987).
' An additional fee of up to $150 also may be imposed by the court. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-43-10 (1986).
' The court may allow limited driving privileges. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
2-127(4) (Supp. 1987).
' A $175 fee may be required for the alcohol and driving education pro-
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gram with the license suspension continuing until the program has been com-
pleted. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1209a (1987).
' The court may issue a restricted license to a defendant who enters an
alcohol education or treatment program. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1 (1988).
For the alcohol safety program the defendant must pay a fee of between $250
and $300. I& § 18.2-271.1(B).
0 In lieu of part or all of the fine, or in addition to the fine, the court may
provide for community service. Act of July 31, 1988, No. 1987-27 § 2042m (to
be codified at WIS. STAT. § 346.65(2g)). In addition to the fine the court will
impose a $250 driver-improvement surcharge. Act of May 13, 1988, No. 1987-
399 § 443m (to be codified at WIS. STAT. § 346.65(1)).
' After the first 15 days of the revocation period, the defendant is eligible
for a restricted occupational license. Wis. STAT. § 343.30(lq)(b)(2) (1985-1986).
' The judge may suspend part or all of the imprisonment if the defendant
agrees to pursue and completes an alcohol education or treatment program.
Wyo. STAT. § 31-5-233(d) (Supp. 1988).
